This paper examines how the international demand for luxury consumption affects the real estate market in global hotspots. Using a unique data set of housing transactions in Paris, we find that (i) non-resident foreigners crowd out residents in highly desirable areas of the city, especially in good times; (ii) these non-residents overpay and realize lower capital gains when reselling; and (iii) purchases by non-resident foreigners have a causal positive effect on price levels. Our results illustrate the importance of foreign buyers-and their tastes-in attractive locations worldwide.
Introduction
Property ownership has historically been regarded as an expression of wealth. In recent years, the relation between private wealth and global real estate ownership has become even more important-and complex-because of the ongoing globalization of the market for luxury properties. A recent report by Savills documents that the amount of private wealth invested in new large ($10m+) real estate deals worldwide increased from $146bn in 2008 to $308bn in 2012.
Continued global wealth creation has been a key driver for prime property markets. Real estate in prime locations attracts investors seeking a safe haven, a portfolio diversifier, a "trophy asset" that signals power and sophistication, or just personal pleasure. Certain global hotspots, such as London, have traditionally been viewed as safe-haven investments (Badarinza and Ramadorai, 2014) . In other locations, however, safe-haven attributes and the prospect of potential capital gains may not be the first things on foreign buyers' minds. In this paper, we therefore examine how the international demand for luxury consumption can affect housing prices in an attractive location.
The object of our analysis is the Paris housing market. We obtain detailed information on all real estate transactions in the French capital between 1992 and 2011 involving foreign buyers and sellers from a database of notarial deeds. The data are complemented by a random sample of all transactions for which both the buyer and the seller are French. In total, our database covers 72,837 transactions over a 20-year period. We use variation in purchases by non-resident foreigners as a proxy for fluctuations in the international demand for luxury consumption. We validate this measure by showing that a substantial majority of non-resident foreigners indeed use their property as a secondary residence. Relatively few properties bought by non-resident foreigners are rented out (or resold quickly), backing up anecdotal evidence that Paris is not the first choice for foreign real estate investors with primarily financial motivations.
1 We find much variation in the relative importance of non-residents across buyer nationality groups. For example, we show that Swiss (resp. Chinese) buyers are much more likely to be non-residents (resp. residents) in France, and to use their property as a secondary (resp. primary) residence.
As a proxy for the attractiveness of each neighborhood as a location for a second home, we collect census data on the proportion of secondary residences among all properties in each neighborhood prior to the start of our sample period. We show that, even if all types of neighborhoods have seen an average net inflow of non-resident foreigners since 1992, the crowding out of residents by non-residents has been much stronger in the most attractive neighborhoods.
Moreover, in line with expectations, we also find that the demand by non-resident foreigners for real estate in desirable areas goes up more in times of rising economic confidence (i.e., years in which equity markets perform well). These results highlight the enduring appeal of luxury property for investors worldwide.
We then hypothesize that non-resident foreigners, who may have less bargaining power and higher private valuations, overpay in the Paris real estate market. We find strong evidence that non-resident owners are indeed paying higher amounts (keeping property characteristics fixed) and are realizing lower capital gains than other real estate market participants.
Finally, we study the impact of the crowding out of residents by non-residents on real estate prices in the French capital. We find a weak positive conditional correlation between the number of purchases by non-resident foreigners and price changes in an area. When instrumenting the number of purchases by non-resident foreigners (using instruments based on the prior inflow of non-residents and on exchange rate changes weighted by the historical nationality composition 1 In this respect, Paris real estate may be compared to luxury collectibles, such as art. Recent figures compiled by Knight Frank indicate that 61% of high-net-worth individuals acquire investments of passion for "personal pleasure" and 15% to signal their "status", while investment was the primary driver for only 22% of respondents.
of the buyer population in an area), the evidence looks much stronger. A ten-percent increase in the annual number of purchases by non-resident foreigners in a neigborhood increases prices by about 0.5 percent.
In November 2013, an article in the Wall Street Journal told the following story: "Last fall, after the euro fell against the dollar and new French tax laws took effect, Ms. Whitaker, a Chicago attorney, made her move: She bought an 800-square-foot, light-filled, classic Parisian apartment a short walk from the Eiffel Tower and the Champs-Élysées. 'It gives me the experience I wanted to have: being a Parisian woman, which I love so much,' said Ms. Whitaker." Our results suggest that Ms. Whitaker is not unique in willing to pay up for the Parisian experience-with considerable effects on the local property market.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, this paper is related to existing studies on the behavior of foreign or "out-of-town" buyers, and their impact on price levels. Chinco and Mayer (2013) document that out-of-town buyers of second houses behaved like misinformed speculators and drove up house price in cities like Phoenix, Las Vegas, and Miami in the mid-2000s. They argue that this type of buyers is less informed about economic fundamentals than local residents, and is therefore more prone to chasing past price trends. Badarinza and Ramadorai (2014) show that international demand for safe-haven assets can impact housing prices in London. Moreover, they argue that "preferred habitats" create temporal persistence in the locational choices of nationality groups of buyers. Cvijanovic, Favilukis, and Polk (2010) study the relation between immigration-typically induced by variation in employment opportunities-and real estate prices. One important difference between these papers and our work is that we focus on the effects of international demand for luxury consumption, which we argue is a more relevant driver of non-resident buyer behavior in Paris than investment motives or future immigration plans.
Second, there is also a small literature on housing price dynamics in highly attractive locations. Ruf and Levi (2011) explore the market for "international" real estate in North America: they study prices of recreational properties in exclusive ski resorts and oceanfront estates, where the rates of foreign ownership are typically elevated. They find that there is a long-term equilibrium relationship between exchange rates and relative price levels. We will build on this result when instrumenting international demand in this paper. Next, Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2013) provide evidence that in highly desirable U.S. cities with low rates of new housing constructionso-called "superstar cities"-a growing group of high-income households has been crowding out households with a lower willingness-to-pay for scarce housing over time. In this sense, living in such a superstar city is like owning a scarce luxury good. In contrast to Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2013) , we are interested in the effects of the international demand for secondary residences.
Third, we add to a literature on the drivers of the demand for luxury consumption goods or "trophy assets". Aït-Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo (2004) show that luxury consumption is highly correlated with equity returns. They also document a positive relation between prices of exclusive New York apartments and the equity market. Goetzmann, Renneboog, and Spaenjers (2011) show how changes in income inequality and financial asset returns affect the demand for artworks.
Fourth, several papers have studied how price outcomes in markets for illiquid and heterogeneous goods are determined by differences in bargaining power and private valuations between buyers and sellers. Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2003) show that bargaining power is inversely related to wealth and trading experience in a market. Lovo and Spaenjers (2014) present a model of trading in unique durable assets-such as artworks and luxury real estate-in which investors with high private use values pay more and realize lower financial returns upon resale.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data, and discusses the geographical and temporal variation in purchases by non-resident foreigners in Paris. It also shows how residents have been crowded out in desirable areas, especially in good times. Section 3 shows that non-residents overpay, and realize lower capital gains when reselling. Section 4 illustrates the weak positive conditional correlation between inflow of nonresident foreigners and property price changes, and then documents a stronger causal effect using an instrumental variables approach. Section 5 concludes. We obtain detailed information on the 39,125 observed transactions of houses and apartments in Paris over the period 1992-2011 in which either the buyer or the seller (or both buyer and seller) was non-French.
3 Moreover, we obtain data on a random sample of 10% of all transactions in which both the buyer and the seller were French households-a sample of 33,712 transactions.
In total, our database thus contains information on 72,837 transactions over a 20-year period.
Our data set contains detailed information on each transaction and the characteristics of each underlying property. Table 1 shows the number of observations and the average transaction price per year for the different combinations of seller and buyer nationality statuses in our data set.
The table illustrates the sharp rise in housing prices in Paris over the last two decades, especially over the periods 1999-2007 and 2009-2011 . It also shows that there have been substantially more purchases than sales by foreigners over our time period. The average price in transactions involving non-French households-and especially in transactions in which the seller was foreignis slightly higher than in exclusively "French" transactions.
[Insert Table 1 about here] Table 2 shows the nationalities that are the most important foreign buyer groups in our data set. We see the largest numbers of purchases by households from Italy, Great Britain, the United States, Portugal, and Algeria. Many of the purchases by foreigners in Paris are of course related to immigration and local employment opportunities rather than the acquisition of a pied-à-terre.
Foreign Purchases and the Demand for Secondary Residences
To document the relevance of luxury consumption demand, we rely on the residence status of the buyers. We argue that purchases by non-resident foreigners are likely to be acquisitions of second homes. We can indirectly test this hypothesis because the data enable us to compute how frequently sellers of each nationality group used their property as a secondary residence (rather than as a rental property, for example). [Insert Table 2 about here]
To further rule out the possibility that speculative investment is a major motive for real estate purchases by non-resident foreigners in Paris, we compute average holding periods for different groups of sellers. The average holding period for domestic sellers is 10.8 years, which compares to 9.8 years for non-resident foreign sellers. These numbers suggest that there is little difference in the speculative activity between foreign and domestic sellers. We can also consider a few descriptive statistics. The average age among all non-resident foreign buyers in our sample is 49.5 years, compared to 42.8 years for all other buyers. While 50% of non-resident foreign buyers have higher managerial and professional positions, only 40% of the other buyers do. Moreover, non-residents buy substantially more expensive properties. For example, in 2011 the average price of a purchase by a non-resident foreigner was 537,543 euros; by contrast, in the "French" sample the average purchase price was 429,306 euros (cf. Table 1 ). This evidence is consistent with luxury consumption motives being important among non-resident foreigners active in the Paris real estate market.
We now turn to the geographical spread of foreign purchases. Figure 1 shows a map of Paris. 4 We have data on the use by sellers in about half of all cases. The percentages reported here are ratios computed using the non-missing observations. The (intended) use is missing much more frequently for buyers. A small fraction of foreigners who are officialy not a resident of France seem to use their Paris property as their primary residence.
The area covered by the city is 105 square kilometers (or 41 square miles). Paris is divided into 20 administrative districts or "arrondissements". Each district has its own postal code and city hall. The district has become an important unit of geographical reference in the city. Figure 1 indicates the districts and the location of some of Paris' most famous buildings and museums.
[Insert Figure 1 about here] Table 3 shows how many of the foreign purchases in our database take place in each of these districts. The table also shows how many foreign purchases were by non-residents. Not surprisingly, the percentages are very high for, for example, the 5 th , the 6 th , and the 7 th arrondissement, with the Quartier Latin, the Jardin du Luxembourg, and the Eiffel Tower respectively. The proportions are much lower for the less touristic outer districts, such as the 19 th and the 20 th arrondissements.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Neighborhood Desirability and the Crowding Out of Residents
As the city of Paris has about 2.3 million inhabitants, the average district has a population of over 100,000. Moreover, the districts vary widely in size and population. We therefore use information on a more detailed level, namely that of the "IRIS" ( As a proxy for the attractiveness of each neighborhood as a location for a second home, we collect census data from INSEE on the proportion of secondary residences among all properties in each neighborhood in the year 1990. 5 Importantly, this measure looks at the stock rather than the flow of real estate, and it uses data from before the start of our sample period.
We expect non-resident foreigners to purchase real estate in the areas most attractive to buyers of secondary houses. Table 4 shows the estimated relative importance of purchases by non-resident foreigners, aggregated across the whole sample period, for deciles of "desirability" (i.e., the proportion of secondary residences in 1990). As expected we see a strong positive correlation between neighborhood attractiveness as a location for a second home and the importance of purchases by non-resident foreigners in our database (for example, in the least attractive neighborhoods foreign non-residents contribute 1.3% to total purchasing activity, while in the most attractive neighborhoods this percentage rises up to 8.3%). The third column in Table 4 shows a very different pattern for resident foreigners: for example, purchases by resident foreigners constitute 6.8% of all purchasing activity in the bottom decile of neighborhoods sorted on their attractiveness, while their purchases contribute only 4% to all buying activity in the top decile. These figures suggest that we are not just picking up the effect of differences in demand between French nationals and foreigners.
We also compute the aggregate net inflow as the number of purchases by non-resident foreigners minus the number of sales by non-resident foreigners in an area over our complete sample period 1992-2011. The fourth column of Table 4 shows the accumulated net inflow of nonresident foreigners per deciles of desirability. The fifth column further shows the number of years (out of 20) in which net inflow was positive for each desirability category. We see that all
5 It is important to note that different area characteristics may be important for primary and secondary homes. For example, proximity to schools or traffic routes may not play a role for second homes. As such, local high income earners do not necessarily sort in the areas that are most desirable in the eyes of non-residents, and therefore (implied) rents are not necessarily highest in those areas.
neighborhoods have seen a positive net inflow of non-resident foreigners, but that the crowding out has been much stronger in the most attractive neighborhoods.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The crowding out of local residents by wealthy non-resident foreigners over time is similar to the historical trends in "superstar cities" documented by Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2013) , but on a supra-national level and in the market for secondary residences. Given the positive covariance between equity returns and luxury consumption demand, as documented in (Aït-Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo, 2004), we would also expect that the demand by non-resident foreigners for real estate in desirable areas goes up more in "good times". We test this hypothesis by relating the annual number of purchases by non-resident foreigners in a neighborhood to the interaction between neighborhood desirability and lagged equity market returns (as captured by returns on the French index CAC40), controlling for year fixed effects and the desirability of the neighborhood. The results of the regression analysis confirm this hypothesis-see models (1) and (2) in Table 5 . The estimated coefficient on the interaction term is positive and highly significant, suggesting that purchases by non-resident foreigners indeed increase more in desirable areas in "good times", i.e., when the equity market is doing well. On the other hand, as we can see from columns (3) and (4), the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically significant in the case of resident foreigners.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Bargaining Power and Prices Paid by Non-Residents
Prices paid in the real estate market may be a function of the attributes of (potential) buyers and sellers. For a number of different reasons, we could expect non-resident foreigners to overpay in the Paris real estate market. Previous studies have shown that housing market participants that are uninformed (Wilhelmsson, 2008) and wealthy (Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans, 2003) have less bargaining power. Lovo and Spaenjers (2014) present a model of trading in luxury assets in which investors with a high private valuation of the asset are willing to pay more, and realize lower financial returns when reselling.
However, how market participant characteristics relate to bargaining power is not straightforward to measure by comparing prices using hedonic methods, as preferences may be correlated with characteristics. For example, non-resident foreigners may pay more either because they have less bargaining power, or because they buy flats of higher quality along some unobservable dimension. Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2003) propose the following solution to this problem. Assume that we are interested in the effect of a certain binary attribute (e.g., non-resident foreigner or not) on the price outcome, and that the dummy variable B (resp. S) captures this attribute for the buyer (resp. seller). Under the assumptions of symmetric bargaining power and symmetric demand over buyers and sellers, one can identify the effect of this attribute on bargaining power by introducing the variables (S − B) and (S + B) to the hedonic regression.
The coefficient on the first variable measures the effect of seller and buyer traits on bargaining power, while the coefficient on the second variable measures the effect of the same characteristics on demand. We thus run the following hedonic regression:
where P i,t is the price of property i in year t, x m,i is the value of hedonic characteristic m for are dummy variables that equal one if the seller or the buyer is a non-resident foreigner.
The "bargaining-power coefficient" κ will be negative if non-resident foreign buyers pay more and sell for less. The "demand coefficient" λ will be positive if non-resident foreigners select properties that are of otherwise unobservably higher quality.
Column (1) of Table 6 shows the results of a regression on our data with the following hedonic characteristics as control variables: (log) floor level, (log) surface area (in m 2 ), dummy variables indicating the period of construction (going from "before 1850" to "2000-2010"), and dummy variables indicating the presence of a parking place, an elevator, or a terrace. The results clearly
show that non-resident foreigners have less bargaining power: they pay more and sell for less.
(Not unsurprisingly, we also find that non-resident foreigners prefer properties that are of higher quality in a way not captured by our hedonic variables.) Importantly, the effect is not driven by the foreign nationality of these individuals: column (2) of Table 6 shows opposite signs on the equivalent variables for resident foreigners. In column (3), we also control for differences in bargaining power related to gender, age, and marital status, but the conclusions remain the same.
(In line with previous research, we find that female and older individuals have substantially less bargaining power.)
[Insert Table 6 about here]
As we also have information on the previous transaction price for slightly more than half of the transactions in our database (even if it took place before 1992), we can verify that nonresident owners are indeed realizing lower capital gains between purchase and sale. To control for the possibility that price appreciation trends vary in function of the demography of the neighborhood-for example because of changes in the wage premium paid to college-educated workers-we use data from INSEE on the percentage of adults with a higher education degree in each neighborhood (measured in 1990, so before the start of our time frame). Converted to terciles, this gives the variable E. We then run a regression of the following form:
where R Column (1) of Table 7 show the results of the estimation of equation (2). We limit our sample to holding periods of at most 20 years, to mitigate the effects of improvements and/or deteriorations that may become important over longer time periods, and that might also correlate with buyer and seller attributes. In line with the hedonic results, we find that non-resident foreigners realize significantly lower capital gains. The annualized capital gain is lowered by more than one percentage point on average (the reported coefficient on S
is -0.013), so the effect is also economically meaningful. Furthermore, capital gains realized by all owners are higher if they resell to a non-resident foreigner (the estimated coefficient on B
is 0.005 and is highly statistically significant). Importantly, we keep the year of purchase and the year of sale constant here; ours is thus not a result about timing of exit as in Chinco and Mayer (2013) .
In column (2), we add arrondissement fixed effects to our model, to control for, for example, geographical variation in the longer-run gentrification trends within the city. The results remain very similar.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
The Impact of Non-Resident Demand on Prices

Conditional Correlations
A next question is what is the impact of the crowding out of residents by non-residents on real estate prices in the French capital? In a first step, we expand equation (2) as follows:
where P urchases Table 8 . We need to limit ourselves to properties for which we observe two prices between 1992 and 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by arrondissement. We see a highly significant-but in terms of economic magnitude relatively low-positive conditional correlation between the number of purchases by non-resident foreigners and price changes. (The coefficient of 0.005 implies that ten percent more purchases by non-resident foreigners goes together with an price increase of about 0.05 percent.) To mitigate concerns that the effect is driven by overpaying on the part of non-residents with low bargaining power (or high private valuations), we repeat the estimation excluding properties sold to nonresident foreigners in column (2). The regression coefficient is about 40% smaller than before, but the effect does not completely disappear (p-value = 0.116).
In column (3), we allow for arrondissement-specific price trends. In column (4), we control for the desirability of each neighborhood, measured by the variable Secondary n , i.e., the proportion of secondary residences prior to the start of our sample period. This variable could pick up differences in average price trends between neighborhoods that are more or less attractive to non-residents. In column (5), we combine the arrondissement fixed effects and the desirability variable as controls. Even though the slope coefficients on the variable of interest are still positive, they are not statistically significantly different from zero at traditional levels. By contrast, there is a strong positive correlation between the attractiveness of a neighborhood as location for a secondary residence on the one hand and appreciation rates on the other hand.
Panel B of Table 8 repeats all models using a lagged independent variable, i.e., the number of purchases by non-resident foreigners in the neighborhood between year y 1 − 1 and year y 2 − 1.
Again, we see a statistically significant positive conditional correlation between lagged number of purchases by non-resident foreigners and price changes. When we exclude transactions that involve purchases by non-resident foreigners, the estimated conditional correlation remains positive and highly significant. Once we add controls for the arrondissement-specific price trends and/or for the desirability of a neighborhood, the estimated conditional correlation remains positive, but the statistical significance largely disappears.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Instrumental variables approach
One concern is that properties in neighborhoods with different inflows of non-residents might have different rates of appreciation for reasons unrelated to that inflow, even when controlling for the different capital gains on houses in (ex ante) highly educated or attractive areas over our time frame. For example, it may be that public investments in the quality of daily life in a neighborhood lead to both an increase in property prices and to an increase (or decrease) in the attractiveness of the neighborhood to foreigners.
To solve this endogeneity problem, we need to find an exogenous source of variation in the number of purchases by non-resident foreigners, so that we can implement an instrumental variables approach. We proceed as follows. We split the sample time frame in half. We use prior to the beginning of the sample, in 1990. The rationale for using this instrument is that the number of foreign non-resident purchases is expected to be correlated over time. The intuition for this rationale is twofold. First, as argued by Badarinza and Ramadorai (2014) in the case of the London property market, foreign buyers flock together in so-called "preferred habitats", which generates temporal persistence in the locational choices of nationality groups of buyers.
Second, the initial presence of different foreign buyer nationality groups leads to a reduction of information asymmetries, which can spur future foreign buyer inflow. The number of non-resident foreign purchases in an area prior to 2002 should thus predict non-resident foreign purchases since 2002, while being orthogonal to unexplained property capital gains in that later period.
Our second instrument, F X q,y 1 −1→y 2 −1 , relies on changes in demand fluctuations for Paris real estate as a luxury good induced by changes in the relative strength of the local currency needed to pay for a property. Ruf and Levi (2011) show that prices of "international properties" (e.g., ski resorts and oceanfront estates) in North America are affected by exchange rate movements.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that exchange rates matter for the Paris housing market as well, 6 and regressions of annual purchases (or net inflows) by non-resident foreigners from different countries against changes in the relevant exchange rates confirm that a relation exists (not reported). We construct an instrument that varies both geographically and over time. Table 9 shows the results of our analysis. In each case, we instrument the average annual number of purchases by non-resident foreigners over the holding period in the first step, using the two variables presented above. In the second step, we estimate the relation between non-resident demand and prices as described by equation (3). In Panel A, we include arrondissement fixed effects, but do not control for variation in the desirability of neighborhoods. In Panel B, we also control for the desirability of neighborhoods, using the proportion of secondary residences in 1990. In Panel C, we allow for differences in average appreciation rates between each combination of holding interval and desirability decile, i.e.,
[Insert Table 9 about here]
We find that purchases in the first half of our time frame carry strong predictive power for pur- By inspecting the estimated coefficients on ln P urchases N RF n,y 1 →y 2 in the second-stage regressions, we see that they are positive and significant at conventional levels across the board, ranging from 0.048 in Panel C to 0.058 in Panel B. Therefore, in all cases we can conclude that purchases by non-resident foreigners impact price levels in a statistically significant way. A ten-percent increase in the number of annual purchases by non-resident foreigners-or, more precisely, an increase in the demand by non-residents that leads to such a ten-percent increase-causes an increase in prices of about 0.5 percent. It is interesting to note, however, that the positive coefficient on the desirability variable disappears in the second-stage regression of Panel B; we can thus conclude that the higher capital gains in desirable areas are due to the demand by non-resident foreigners in those neighborhoods.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how the international demand for luxury consumption affects prices and returns in the Paris housing market. We obtain detailed information on all real estate transactions in Paris between 1992 and 2011 involving foreign buyers and sellers-and on a random sample of transactions with French buyers and sellers-from a database of notarial deeds. We find that (i) non-resident foreigners crowd out residents in highly attractive areas of the city, especially in good times, (ii) these non-residents overpay and realize lower capital gains when reselling, and (iii) purchases by non-resident foreigners have a causal effect on price levels.
These results contribute to our understanding of the role of foreign or "out-of-town" buyers in real estate markets, and of the housing price formation in highly attractive locations. Notes: This table shows the relative importance of non-resident and resident foreigners among all real estate buyers in neighborhood deciles sorted by the percentage of residences that were used as secondary residences in 1990. It also provides information on the net inflow (i.e., purchases minus sales) by non-resident foreigners in the different neighborhood desirability deciles. Notes: This table shows the results of a set of regressions with the number of purchases by non-resident or resident foreigners in neighborhood n in year t as the dependent variable. Secondary n equals one plus the percentage of residences in neighborhood n that were used as secondary residences in 1990. Equities t−1 is the lagged return on the CAC40. Standard errors are below the coefficients. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. ) is a dummy variable that equals one if the seller (resp. buyer) of the property is a non-resident foreigner. S RF i,t (resp. B RF i,t ) is a dummy variable that equals one if the seller (resp. buyer) of the property is a resident foreigner. "Other buyer and seller controls" are variables capturing gender, age, and marital status of the seller and the buyer. "Hedonic characteristics" are (log) floor level, (log) surface area (in m 2 ), dummy variables indicating the period of construction, and dummy variables indicating the presence of a parking place, an elevator, and a terrace. Standard errors are below the coefficients. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. ) is a dummy variable that equals one if the seller (resp. buyer) of the property in year y 2 is a non-resident foreigner. Y 1 × Y 2 × E is a triple interaction of purchase year, sale year, and neighborhood education level tercile dummies. Standard errors are below the coefficients, and are clustered at the arrondissement level in column (1). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. ) is a dummy variable that equals one if the seller (resp. buyer) of the property in year y 2 is a non-resident foreigner. Secondary n equals one plus the percentage of residences in neighborhood n that were used as secondary residences in 1990. Y 1 × Y 2 × E is a triple interaction of purchase year, sale year, and neighborhood education level tercile dummies. Model (2) excludes purchases by non-resident foreign buyers. Standard errors are below the coefficients, and are clustered at the arrondissement level in columns (1) and (2). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step is the dependent variable in the first step, and equals one plus the number of purchases by non-resident foreigners in neighborhood n between y 1 and y 2 , annualized by dividing by y 2 − y 1 . RelP urchases N RF q,1992→2001 equals one plus the number of purchases by non-resident foreigners in area q between 1992 and 2001, scaled by dividing by the population of the area in 1990. Areas are larger than neighborhoods, but smaller than arrondissements. F X q,y 1 −1→y 2 −1 equals the log annualized gross change in the weighted real exchange rate (foreign currency / euro) between 15 countries and France between y 1 − 1 and y 2 − 1, with the weights given by the relative importance of the different nationalities among the non-resident foreign buyers in area q between 1992 and 2001. Seller and buyer controls are dummy variables that equal one if the seller or buyer of the property in year y 2 is a non-resident foreigner. Secondary n equals one plus the percentage of residences in neighborhood n that were used as secondary residences in 1990. Y 1 × Y 2 × E is a triple interaction of purchase year, sale year, and neighborhood education level tercile dummies. Y 1 × Y 2 × D is a triple interaction of purchase year, sale year, and neighborhood desirability decile dummies, based on the percentage of residences that were used as secondary residences in 1990. Standard errors are below the coefficients. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
